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Fiduciary-Based Standards for Bailout 
Contractors: What the Treasury Got Right 
and Wrong in TARP 
Kathleen Clark† 
  INTRODUCTION   
In 2008 the United States faced a financial crisis of epic 
proportions.1 The federal government responded by bailing out 
many of the largest financial services companies.2 The bailouts 
began in the spring of 2008 and expanded later that year with 
the passage of legislation authorizing the Troubled Asset Relief 
 
†  Professor of Law and Israel Treiman Faculty Fellow, Washington 
University in St. Louis, kathleen@wustl.edu. Some of the research for this Ar-
ticle was supported by a contract from the Administrative Conference of the 
United States (Contract No. AC10101, FY 2010). The ideas expressed are my 
own and do not necessarily represent the views of the Administrative Confer-
ence. I am grateful to Scott Amey, Cheryl Block, Daniel Keating, and Bruce 
Shirk for commenting on earlier versions of this Article. Copyright © 2011 by 
Kathleen Clark. 
 1. See HENRY M. PAULSON, JR., ON THE BRINK: INSIDE THE RACE TO 
STOP THE COLLAPSE OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 250–62 (2010) (giving 
a personal account of some important events in the financial crisis). 
 2. Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Govern-
ment’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 508–25 (2009) 
(providing an overview of the financial crisis and the government’s sprawling 
series of bailouts).  
[T]he government forced the sales of one of the five largest invest-
ment banks, the largest thrift in the country, and a number of con-
sumer banks. . . . [It] took over the country’s largest insurer and na-
tionalized the two government-sponsored enterprises that mortally 
suffered from the popping of the housing bubble. . . . [It] forc[ed] the 
nation’s nine largest remaining financial institutions to accept $125 
billion of government equity . . . . It flooded the global markets with 
liquidity and entered the commercial paper market on a massive 
scale. . . .[a]nd . . . rescue[d] . . . Citigroup and Bank of America, two 
of the nation’s largest financial institutions. 
Id. at 465; see also Karen Weise & Dan Nguyen, Interactive: Which Banks Got 
Emergency Loans from the Fed During the Financial Meltdown?, PROPUBLICA 
(Dec. 1, 2010, 6:45 PM), http://projects.propublica.org/tables/treasury-facilities 
-loans. 
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Program (TARP).3 Rather than examining whether the gov-
ernment should have bailed out these companies, this Article 
examines one aspect of how the government bailed them out: 
its reliance on outsiders—instead of government employees—to 
implement the bailout program.4 In particular, this Article fo-
cuses on the imposition of fiduciary standards on the outsiders 
who implemented the bailout. 
Part I of this Article shows that the Treasury Department 
(Treasury) delegated primary responsibility for implementing 
the bailout to outsiders, and explains that this kind of outsourc-
ing is common in the federal government. Part II describes how 
Treasury imposed fiduciary-based ethics standards on these 
outsiders, and identifies both restrictions that are worth emu-
lating and those that are troubling. Part III puts Treasury’s ac-
tions into a broader context, showing that while the govern-
ment imposes fiduciary-based ethics standards on its own 
employees, it generally does not impose them on its service con-
tractor personnel. Finally, this Article argues that the Treas-
ury’s actual experience with bailout contractors should be stud-
ied more closely to assess the costs and benefits of imposing 
ethics standards on outsiders who do the government’s work. 
I.  OUTSIDERS’ RESPONSIBILITY FOR IMPLEMENTING 
THE BAILOUT   
The TARP legislation recognized that Treasury would need 
not only financial resources for bailout recipients but also addi-
tional personnel so Treasury could administer the bailout pro-
gram.5 It therefore authorized Treasury to hire additional em-
ployees.6 In light of the need to act quickly during the financial 
 
 3. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 
§ 101(a)(1), 122 Stat. 3765, 3767. 
 4. Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 2, at 469 n.10 (“The government 
. . . hire[d] a team of sophisticated investment bankers, lawyers, and asset 
managers to assist it in implementing the [bailout]. [I]t also contributed to the 
privatization of government functions . . . .”). As of September 30, 2010, the 
Treasury had spent $436.7 million on fifteen financial agency agreements and 
eighty-one contracts. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, OCTOBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: 
EXAMINING TREASURY’S USE OF FINANCIAL CRISIS CONTRACTING AUTHORITY 5 
(2010) [hereinafter CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, OCTOBER REPORT]; see also 
CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, MARCH OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE FINAL REPORT OF 
THE CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL 130 (2011) [hereinafter CONG. 
OVERSIGHT PANEL, MARCH REPORT]. 
 5. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 101(a)(1). 
 6. Id. (“The Secretary shall have direct hiring authority with respect to 
the appointment of employees to administer this Act.”). 
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crisis and the long delays often involved in hiring new federal 
employees, Congress authorized Treasury to hire outsiders to 
administer the bailout programs.7 The TARP legislation speci-
fied two different types of outsiders: contractors and financial 
agents.8 
Much scholarly and other attention has been paid to gov-
ernment contractors (particularly in the wake of privatization 
efforts during the 1990s and the extensive use of contractors in 
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan).9 Government contractors 
are private sector entities from whom the government purchas-
es products or services.10 Less attention has been paid to the 
government’s financial agents.11 Financial agents are private- 
sector entities to whom the government delegates particular 
tasks, giving them governmental power or access to a govern-
ment asset so that they can perform those tasks.12 The Treas-
ury’s use of financial agency agreements dates back to the Na-
tional Bank Act of 1864, which granted Treasury the authority 
to appoint banks as financial agents of the government.13  
Several features of financial agents made them key to the 
Treasury’s ability to outsource the TARP program. First, finan-
cial agents can act on behalf of the sovereign and have deci-
 
 7. Id.  
 8. The legislation authorized the Treasury to “[d]esignat[e] financial in-
stitutions as financial agents” and “enter[ ] into contracts,” including contracts 
for the temporary or intermittent services of experts and consultants under 5 
U.S.C. § 3109. See id. § 101(a)(3)(B)(ii). 
 9. See, e.g., PRATAP CHATTERJEE, HALLIBURTON’S ARMY: HOW A WELL-
CONNECTED TEXAS OIL COMPANY REVOLUTIONIZED THE WAY AMERICA MAKES 
WAR, at xv–xvi (2009); ALLISON STANGER, ONE NATION UNDER CONTRACT: 
THE OUTSOURCING OF AMERICAN POWER AND THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN POLICY 
2–7 (2009); PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY: WHY 
PRIVATIZATION OF GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND 
WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 147–50 (2007). 
 10. See 4 U.S.C. § 441c(a)(1) (2006). 
 11. The focus of much of the available literature is on traditional contrac-
tors. See generally CHATTERJEE, supra note 9; STANGER, supra note 9; 
VERKUIL; supra note 9. 
 12. 12 U.S.C. § 90 (2006) (authorizing government to employ national 
banking associations as financial agents); United States v. Citizens & S. Nat’l 
Bank, 889 F.2d 1067, 1069 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“[T]he government as principal 
and in its sovereign capacity delegates to its financial agents some of the sover-
eign functions that the government itself would otherwise perform.”); 31 
C.F.R. §§ 202.1–.7 (2010); Bruce Shirk, The Financial Crisis: Addressing 
Troubled Assets, Teapot Dome, Tainted Contracts and False Claims 1 (Oct. 9, 
2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (“The legislation provides 
for award of contracts to financial institutions to acquire, manage, and dispose 
of assets . . . .”).  
 13. Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank, 889 F.2d at 1069.  
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sionmaking authority that, at least in theory, cannot be out-
sourced to ordinary government contractors.14  
Second, the government’s agreements with financial agents 
are different from regular government contracts in that agree-
ments with financial agents are not subject to the extensive set 
of statutes and regulations limiting the government’s discretion 
in awarding and administering contracts.15 The process of 
choosing financial agents is more streamlined than that of 
choosing government contractors, enabling Treasury to avoid 
lengthy delays.16  
Finally—and most important for the purposes of this Ar-
ticle—financial agents are agents in the eyes of the law.17 They 
stand in a principal-agent relationship with the government. 
By reason of their status as agents, they owe fiduciary duties to 
the government.18  
Treasury embraced the statutory authority to use outsid-
ers. It entered into agreements with fifteen financial agents 
and fifty-three contractors.19 Financial agents manage TARP 
investments.20 Contractors perform others services, including 
auditing and legal services.21 Treasury has paid these contrac-
tors and financial agents more than $400 million to administer 
TARP.22 
 
 14. Id. at 1069–70; Policy Letter on Inherently Governmental Functions, 
57 Fed. Reg. 45,096 (Sept. 30, 1992), available at http://www.census.gov/procur/ 
www/fssp/att10a.html. 
 15. Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank, 889 F.2d at 1069 (holding that financial 
agency agreements are not subject to the federal procurement law which gov-
erns ordinary contracts). 
 16. See Treasury’s Use of Emergency Contracting Authority: Hearing Be-
fore the Cong. Oversight Panel, 111 Cong. 17 (2010) (testimony of Gary Grippo, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Fiscal Operations and Policy, United States 
Department of the Treasury), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG 
-111shrg65080/html/CHRG-111shrg65080.htm (describing the differences be-
tween the process of selecting contractors and the process of selecting agents).  
 17. See id. at 2. 
 18. See Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank, 889 F.2d at 1069; cf. Transactive Corp. 
v. United States, 91 F.3d 232, 239–41 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding that financial 
institutions that administer an Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT) system are 
not financial agents of the government).  
 19. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, OCTOBER REPORT, supra note 4, at 5; see 
also CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, MARCH REPORT, supra note 4, at 130. 
 20. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, OCTOBER REPORT, supra note 4, at 5.  
 21. Id. at 2 (“The largest TARP contracts have gone to law firms, invest-
ment management firms, and audit firms.”). 
 22. Id. at 5. 
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These outsiders performed “many of the TARP’s most criti-
cal functions.”23 Most of the individuals who administer TARP 
are not government employees, but instead are employed by 
these outside organizations.24 According to the Congressional 
Oversight Panel, Treasury engaged in “the wholesale delega-
tion of the administration of [these] multi-billion dollar pro-
grams to outside entities.”25 
This “wholesale delegation” of the government’s work put 
the government at risk for abuse by those outsiders. As the 
next section explains, Congress and Treasury recognized that 
risk and put in place fiduciary-based ethics standards for those 
outsiders to prevent or deter such abuse.  
II.  IMPOSITION OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES ON OUTSIDERS 
ADMINISTERING THE BAILOUT   
The TARP legislation itself, the regulations implementing 
that legislation, and the specific contracts between Treasury 
and outsiders all reflect the fiduciary nature of the relationship 
between the government and the outsiders administering the 
TARP program.26 This Part describes the law of fiduciary rela-
tionships and shows how the TARP program explicitly and im-
plicitly adopts fiduciary standards for the outsiders administer-
ing the bailout.  
A. THE FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION 
In most relationships between two parties, the law pre-
sumes that each party is equal to the other.27 The parties 
themselves can define the contours of their relationship 
 
 23. Id.; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-16, 
TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM: ONE YEAR LATER, ACTIONS ARE NEEDED 
TO ADDRESS REMAINING TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY CHALLENGES 
28 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1016.pdf (noting that 
the Treasury had fifty-two contractors and financial agents supporting TARP 
administration and operations). 
 24. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, OCTOBER REPORT, supra note 4, at 3 
(“Treasury has only 220 staffers working on the TARP [while Fannie Mae] has 
600 employees working to fulfill its TARP commitments.”). 
 25. Id. at 5. 
 26. See infra notes 51–59 and accompanying text. The government uses 
the term “contract” to refer to an arrangement with a contractor, the term 
“agreement” to refer to an arrangement with a financial agent, and the term 
“arrangement” to refer to both contracts and agreements. See CONG. 
OVERSIGHT PANEL, OCTOBER REPORT, supra note 4, at 5–6. This Article refers 
to all of these arrangements as contracts.  
 27. See Robert Flannigan, The Fiduciary Obligation, 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 285, 287 n.20 (1989) (explaining the principal/principal relationship). 
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through contractual agreement.28 Any agreement between 
them is presumed to reflect their intentions, and courts will en-
force that agreement.29  
But the law treats differently certain types of relation-
ships: those in which one party stands in a position of trust rel-
ative to the other.30 In a relationship of trust, the trusted party 
is expected to act for the benefit of the other, and the law im-
poses a fiduciary obligation on the trusted party to ensure that 
she acts solely in the interest of the trusting party.31 These are 
called fiduciary relationships, and the trusted party is called a 
fiduciary.32 These relationships are governed not just by the 
explicit terms of any agreement between the parties, but by ad-
 
 28. Robert Flannigan characterizes this as a “principal/principal relation-
ship” and states that in such relationships “[n]o fiduciary obligation is pre-
sumed to exist.” Id. at 287. Flannigan asserts that “[a] principal/principal rela-
tionship exists, for example, between arm’s length buyers and sellers.” Id. at 
287 n.20. This assertion is certainly accurate with regard to “buyers and sel-
lers” of goods. Whether it is also true for “buyers and sellers” of services would 
depend on the nature of the services at issue. If the service involves one party 
giving advice to the other or one party gaining access to the other’s assets, 
then it would be a fiduciary relationship even if entered into through arm’s-
length bargaining. For an example of this concept, see United States v. Citi-
zens & S. Nat’l Bank, 889 F.2d 1067, 1068–69 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (noting that 
certain banks which placed bids in order to administer a reporting system en-
tered an agency relationship).  
 29. See Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary 
Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 887 (“[T]hese creatures of contract law are 
controlled by the parties’ manifest intention . . . .”). But see RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981) (discussing when a contract is unenforce-
able because it is unconscionable).  
 30. See Kathleen Clark, Do We Have Enough Ethics in Government Yet? 
An Answer from Fiduciary Theory, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 57, 69; Flannigan, su-
pra note 27, at 285; Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 
800 (1983); Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 539, 
540 (1949); J.C. Shepherd, Towards a Unified Concept of Fiduciary Relation-
ships, 97 L.Q. REV. 51, 75 (1981).  
 31. Flannigan, supra note 27, at 306 (“The critical feature of these rela-
tionships is that the fiduciary undertakes or agrees to act for or on behalf of or 
in the interests of another person in the exercise of a power or discretion 
which will affect the interests of that other person in a legal or practical 
sense.” (quoting Hosp. Prods. Ltd. v U.S. Surgical Corp. (1984) 156 CLR 41, 
96–97 (Austl.))); see also id. at 307 (“[W]here by statute, agreement, or per-
haps by unilateral undertaking, one party has an obligation to act for the ben-
efit of another, and that obligation carries with it a discretionary power, the 
party thus empowered becomes a fiduciary.” (quoting Guerin v. The Queen, 
[1984] 2 S.C.R. 335, 384 (Can.))).  
 32. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 702 (9th ed. 2009) (“[A fiduciary is a] 
person who is required to act for the benefit of another person on all matters 
within the scope of their [fiduciary] relationship.”). 
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ditional terms imposed by the common law.33 The law sees 
these relationships as valuable and will prevent fiduciaries 
from abusing their position of trust.34 
Fiduciary relationships arise in two distinct factual set-
tings.35 In the first, an influence-based trust relationship, a 
person trusts a fiduciary to influence her decision or action.36 In 
the second, an access-based trust relationship, a person en-
trusts a fiduciary with access to an asset.37 The asset could be 
tangible property, a financial instrument, or confidential in-
formation instead of an “influence” over the trusted party.38 
But the mere existence of influence or access is not enough 
to create a fiduciary relationship.39 The influence or access 
must be coupled with an expectation (either subjectively in-
tended or imposed by operation of law) that the party providing 
the influence or being given access will act in the interest of the 
trusting party.40 If one party gives another access to her assets 
but there is no expectation that the other will use that access 
 
 33. See DeMott, supra note 29, at 887 (“[O]nce a court concludes that a 
particular relationship has a fiduciary character, the parties’ manifest inten-
tion does not control their obligations to each other as dispositively as it does 
under a contract analysis.”).  
 34. See, e.g., Michelle M. Harner, Corporate Control and the Need for 
Meaningful Board Accountability, 94 MINN. L. REV. 541, 542 (2010) (discuss-
ing how courts have used fiduciary law to curb corporate abuse).  
 35. Flannigan, supra note 27, at 309 (“There are . . . two kinds of trusts 
that will attract fiduciary status. They are, firstly, the trust which gives the 
trusted party the ability to exercise ‘influence’ over the trusting party and, sec-
ondly, the trust which allows the trusted party to acquire ‘access’ to the em-
ployment of assets.”). 
 36. Flannigan refers to this type as a “deferential trust.” Id. 
 37. Flannigan refers to this as a “vigilant trust.” Id.  
 38. The fiduciary obligation deters the fiduciary from acting in a way that 
would “have the effect of diverting or not maintaining the asset value.” Id. at 
292. This is commonly referred to as “agency costs,” but Flannigan refers to 
them as “intermediary costs.” Id. at 289. Flannigan further explains: 
Both types of trust in fact result in the trusted party acquiring 
“access” to the employment of assets. In the case of deferential trust, 
however, the access is indirect because it occurs through “influence” 
exerted by the trusted party. But in either case, and to the same ex-
tent, the “access” to assets may be turned to mischievous ends. 
Id. at 309. 
 39. See Peterson v. H & R Block Tax Servs., Inc., 971 F. Supp. 1204, 1214 
(N.D. Ill. 1997) (finding that a client’s isolated transaction for basic tax prepa-
ration and advice was not enough to create a fiduciary relationship). 
 40. See, e.g., Pommier v. Peoples Bank Marycrest, 967 F.2d 1115, 1119 
(7th Cir. 1992) (“The fact that one party trusts the other is insufficient. We 
trust most people with whom we choose to do business. The dominant party 
must accept the responsibility, accept the trust of the other party before a 
court can find a fiduciary relationship.” (citations omitted)). 
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for her benefit, then she has merely given the other a gift and 
no fiduciary obligation arises.41 Similarly, if someone is in a po-
sition to influence the actions of another, but there is no expec-
tation that she should act on the other’s behalf, then no fidu-
ciary duty arises.42 
Courts have recognized the fiduciary nature of many dif-
ferent types of relationships, including those between trustees 
and beneficiaries, agents and principals, lawyers and clients, 
and employees and employers.43 The precise contours of a fidu-
ciary’s obligation vary depending on the kinds of tasks the fidu-
ciary is asked to perform.44 Robert Flannigan has explained 
that the fiduciary obligation has four components: conflict, in-
fluence, partiality, and avoidance.45 The conflict component of 
fiduciary obligation prohibits a fiduciary from putting herself in 
a position where her own interest conflicts with her duty to-
ward the beneficiary.46 More concretely, it prohibits a fiduciary 
from making a recommendation or using government property 
(including information) in a way that provides a benefit to her-
self or to others close to her rather than to the beneficiary.47 
The influence component subjects transactions between certain 
fiduciaries and their beneficiaries to heightened scrutiny to en-
sure that the fiduciary has not unduly influenced the benefi-
ciary’s decision to enter the transaction.48 The partiality com-
ponent requires fiduciaries given responsibility for allocating 
benefits among beneficiaries to treat beneficiaries of the same 
class equally and beneficiaries of different classes fairly.49 The 
avoidance component prohibits certain fiduciaries from delegat-
 
 41. Flannigan, supra note 27, at 308 (“Not every kind of access will be of a 
fiduciary character. A person may acquire access as a gift.”). 
 42. See, e.g., KATHLEEN CLARK, ETHICS FOR AN OUTSOURCED 
GOVERNMENT: REVISED DRAFT 10 n.83 (2011), available at http://www.acus.gov/ 
wp-content/uploads/downloads/2011/03/Clark-Report-v.2.pdf (noting that the 
fiduciary norm against conflicts of interest does not apply to “representative” 
members of federal advisory committees because they “represent particular 
industries or interest groups”).  
 43. Clark, supra note 30. The common law has recognized that govern-
ment employees owe the government fiduciary duties, and the extensive set of 
government ethics statutes and regulations largely reflect fiduciary obliga-
tions of government employees. See CLARK, supra note 42, at 18–19.  
 44. Clark, supra note 30, at 70 (discussing the task of defining the content 
of a fiduciary obligation by its component parts). 
 45. Flannigan, supra note 27, at 311–12.  
 46. See id. at 311. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See id. at 312. 
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ing their duties to others or putting themselves in a position 
where, because of conflict or other concerns, they could not act 
on behalf of the beneficiary.50 
As the following discussion demonstrates, the TARP legis-
lation, regulations, and contracts all express the conflict com-
ponent of the fiduciary duty owed by the outsiders who admin-
ister the TARP program. To a lesser degree, they also reflect 
the avoidance component of fiduciary duty obligations.  
B. EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT RECOGNITION THAT OUTSIDERS 
ADMINISTERING THE BAILOUT OWE FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 
This section discusses how the TARP legislation, its im-
plementing regulations, and the TARP contracts themselves 
recognize the fiduciary position of the outsiders implementing 
the bailout program.  
The TARP legislation implicitly recognized that outsiders 
implementing the TARP program would stand in a fiduciary 
position.51 This recognition appears in two different ways in the 
statute. First, the statute classified some of the outsiders who 
would implement the program as “agents,” a technical legal 
term that carries with it the fiduciary responsibilities of agency 
law.52 The statute authorized Treasury to “[d]esignate financial 
institutions as financial agents of the Federal Government.”53 
Financial agents owe the government fiduciary duties.54 
 
 50. See id.  
 51. In addition to this implicit recognition of the fiduciary status of out-
siders implementing the TARP, the statute explicitly imposed fiduciary duties 
on managers of any public-private investment funds by requiring that they 
acknowledge in writing their fiduciary duty to public investors. Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 125, 122 Stat. 3765, 
3791. The statute also invokes another term, “unjust enrichment,” that is 
sometimes associated with the fiduciary duty. Id. § 101(e). It requires the 
Treasury to “prevent unjust enrichment of financial institutions participating 
in [the] program . . . including by preventing the sale of a troubled asset to the 
Secretary at a higher price than what the seller paid to purchase the asset.” 
Id. But this provision addresses the financial institutions that would be recip-
ients of TARP aid, not the outsiders (financial agents and contractors) that 
would implement the TARP program. See id. § 101(a). Here, the term “unjust 
enrichment” does not imply that these recipient financial institutions owe the 
government a fiduciary duty, but merely that they should not benefit unduly 
from government largesse by selling a “troubled asset” at a higher price than 
they paid for it. See id. § 101(e).  
 52. See id. § 101(c)(3). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id.; see also U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PROCESS FOR SELECTING 
ASSET MANAGERS PURSUANT TO THE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION 
ACT OF 2008, at 1 (2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/ 
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The second way that the TARP legislation implicitly recog-
nized the fiduciary position of those outsiders was its require-
ment that Treasury “address and manage [and] prohibit con-
flicts of interest that may arise in connection with . . . the 
selection or hiring of contractors or advisors, including asset 
managers,” the purchase and management of troubled assets, 
and “any other potential conflict of interest, as the Secretary 
deems necessary or appropriate in the public interest.”55 This 
statutory attention to outsiders’ conflicts of interest is implicit 
recognition that those outsiders owe fiduciary duties. As dis-
cussed above, in most relationships, each party is considered to 
be equal and is not required to have any particular regard for 
the interests of the other party.56 The very premise of contract 
law is that both parties will have conflicting interests and will 
protect those interests in negotiating an agreement between 
them.57 It is only where one party is supposed to act to benefit 
the other that conflicts of interest are at issue.58 One of the 
components of the fiduciary duty is that the trusted party must 
not put herself in a position where her interests conflict with 
her duty to the beneficiary.59  
Congress mandated that Treasury issue conflict-of-interest 
“[r]egulations or guidelines . . . as soon as practicable after the 
date of enactment.”60 Treasury did so by issuing Interim Guide-
lines for Conflicts of Interest just three days after passage of 
TARP in October 200861 and issuing regulations three months 
later.62 Treasury’s regulations are a thorough expression of the 
conflict component of the fiduciary duty—the prohibition on 
making decisions or giving advice where the decision or advice 
could advance the fiduciary’s interest rather than (or in addi-
 
press-releases/Documents/assetmanagers.pdf (“As financial agents, asset man-
agers will have a fiduciary agent-principal relationship with the Treasury with 
a responsibility for protecting the interests of the United States.”).  
 55. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 108(a).  
 56. See Flannigan, supra note 27, at 287 n.20. 
 57. See DeMott, supra note 29, at 887 (“[T]hese creatures of common law 
are controlled by the parties manifest intention . . . .”). 
 58. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 cmt. a (1977) (stating 
that a fiduciary duty arises when one party must act for the benefit of another). 
 59. See Flannigan, supra note 27, at 311. 
 60. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 108(b). 
 61. Interim Guidelines for Conflicts of Interest, U.S. DEPARTMENT 
TREASURY (Oct. 6, 2008), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/ 
Pages/hp1180.aspx; see also CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, OCTOBER REPORT, su-
pra note 4, at 8 (“Interim Final Rule [issued] on January 21, 2009.”).  
 62. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 31.200–.218 (2010). 
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tion to) that of the beneficiary.63 The regulations impose com-
prehensive ethics standards on the contractors who perform 
services to implement TARP.64 They address both the organiza-
tional conflicts of interest of the bailout contracting firms65 and 
the personal conflicts of interest of those firms’ employees.66 
They regulate the financial interests of contractor personnel,67 
their receipt of gifts,68 outside employment,69 and use of gov-
ernment resources.70  
The conflict component is implicated whenever a fiduciary 
has the responsibility to make or influence a decision that could 
affect her own interests as well as that of the beneficiary. The 
standard course is to prohibit a fiduciary from putting herself 
in a position where her decisions or advice could affect her own 
interests (or those of someone close to her).71 Alternatively, a 
fiduciary can disclose the conflict and give the beneficiary the 
opportunity to waive it.72 
The TARP regulations include both a narrow and a broad 
expression of the conflict component. The narrow provision 
prohibits contractor personnel who are responsible for giving 
advice about the purchase of troubled assets from selling such 
assets,73 and it prohibits those who are responsible for valuing, 
managing, or disposing of troubled assets from purchasing 
them.74 The broad provision prohibits certain contractor per-
sonnel from having “a personal, business, or financial interest 
. . . that could adversely affect [her] ability to perform[,] . . . her 
objectivity or judgment in such performance, or . . . her ability 
 
 63. See generally Flannigan, supra note 27, at 311 (discussing the “con-
flict” component of the fiduciary obligation). 
 64. See 31 C.F.R. § 31.200 (“This regulation addresses actual and poten-
tial conflicts of interest that may arise from contracts and financial agency 
agreements between private sector entities and the Treasury for services un-
der TARP . . . .”). 
 65. Id. § 31.211. 
 66. Id. § 31.212; see also CLARK, supra note 42, at 23–24 (distinguishing 
between personal and organizational conflicts). 
 67. Id. § 31.201. The TARP regulation does not impose restrictions direct-
ly on contractor personnel. Instead, it mandates that contractors ensure that 
their employees “have no personal conflicts of interest.” Id. § 31.212(a).  
 68. Id. § 31.213(a)(1). 
 69. Id. § 31.214. 
 70. Id. § 31.213(a)(2) (“Treasury property”); id. § 31.217 (“nonpublic in-
formation”). 
 71. Clark, supra note 30, at 85.  
 72. An additional option is for the fiduciary to find ways to mitigate the 
conflict of interest. 48 C.F.R. § 9.506(b)(1) (2010).  
 73. 31 C.F.R. § 31.214(b). 
 74. Id. § 31.214(a). 
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to represent the interest of the Treasury.”75 This restriction 
reaches not just the interests of the individuals performing 
TARP work, but also the interests of their family members.76 
This regulatory language is so broad that it is difficult to dis-
cern its dimensions. Thus, Treasury requires that these con-
tractor personnel disclose any such interests to the TARP con-
tractor.77 After this disclosure, the TARP contractor has three 
options: (1) certify that the relevant personnel have no con-
flicts, (2) create a plan to mitigate those conflicts and seek 
Treasury’s approval of that plan, or (3) seek Treasury’s waiver 
of the conflicts.78  
The conflict component is also implicated when a fiduciary 
accepts a gift from someone who has an interest in the deci-
sions the fiduciary makes or the advice that she gives.79 The is-
sue is whether the fiduciary may be influenced in her deci-
sionmaking or advice giving by such a gift. Since it can be 
difficult or impossible to detect whether a fiduciary is actually 
influenced in this way, the standard course is to prohibit a fi-
duciary from accepting such gifts or permit them to accept only 
gifts of minimal value.80 The Treasury regulations take the first 
approach, prohibiting TARP contractor personnel from accept-
ing and soliciting gifts from anyone whose interests could be 
substantially affected by the contract.81 
Another aspect of the fiduciary duty reflected in TARP is 
the prohibition on using for one’s own benefit property that be-
longs to a beneficiary.82 The property may be tangible, or it may 
be information. The fiduciary duty protects both, as do Treas-
 
 75. Id. § 31.201(5). The TARP regulation does not impose restrictions di-
rectly on contractor personnel. Instead, it mandates that contractors ensure 
that their employees “have no personal conflicts of interest.” Id. § 31.212(a). 
 76. Id. § 31.212(b) (“[A personal conflict of interest includes an individu-
al’s] personal, business, and financial relationships, as well as those of their 
spouses, minor children, and other family members with whom the individuals 
have a close personal relationship that would cause a reasonable person with 
knowledge of the relevant facts to question the individual’s ability to perform, 
his or her objectivity or judgment in such performance, or his or her ability to 
represent the interests of the Treasury.” (emphasis added)). 
 77. Id. The regulation specifies that this disclosure must be at least as de-
tailed as that required of high-level executive branch officials. Id. 
§ 31.217(c)(5). 
 78. Id. § 31.212(d). 
 79. Clark, supra note 30, at 79.  
 80. See, e.g., 5 C.F.R. § 2635.302 (2010) (gift restrictions on government 
employees). 
 81. 31 C.F.R. § 31.213(a)(1). 
 82. Id. § 31.213(a)(2). 
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ury’s regulations. TARP contractor personnel are prohibited 
from “improper use of Treasury property,”83 and are prohibited 
from both disclosing and using “nonpublic information.”84 The 
TARP regulations also require contractors to train any person-
nel who receive nonpublic information on their duty of confi-
dentiality.85  
Treasury’s approach is not just comprehensive but also 
flexible. While all bailout services are presumptively covered by 
the restrictions, Treasury allows the TARP Chief Compliance 
Officer to exempt contracts for “administrative services” that do 
not implicate fiduciary concerns.86 
Fiduciary principles are found not just in the TARP legisla-
tion and Treasury’s regulations, but also in Treasury’s specific 
contractual agreements with outsiders. In its agreements with 
financial agents, the financial agents must acknowledge that 
they “owe[] a fiduciary duty of loyalty and fair dealing to the 
United States” and “agree[] to act at all times in the best inter-
ests of the United States.”87 In addition to this explicit state-
ment of their fiduciary duties, the agreements also implement 
the conflict and avoidance components of the fiduciary duty, re-
quiring the disclosure and mitigation of conflicts of interest88 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. § 31.217(b)(1). The TARP regulation defines “nonpublic informa-
tion” as “[a]ny information that Treasury provides to a [contractor] . . . or that 
the [contractor] obtains or develops pursuant to the arrangement . . . until the 
Treasury determines otherwise in writing, or the information becomes part of 
the body of public information from a source other than the retained entity.” 
Id. § 31.217(a). 
 85. Id. § 31.217(c)(3). 
 86. See id. § 31.200(b) (addressing contractual conflicts of interest be-
tween the private sector and the Treasury). 
 87. See, e.g., Financial Agency Agreement for Custodian, Accounting, Auc-
tion Management and Other Infrastructure Services for a Portfolio of Troubled 
Mortgage-Related Assets, U.S. DEPARTMENT TREASURY, § 5 (Dec. 29, 2008), 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/about/procurement/faa/ 
Financial_Agency_Agreements/Bank%20of%20New%20York%20Mellon.pdf 
[hereinafter Financial Agency Agreement]; see also id. § 18.C (“[A contractual 
default occurs when] the Financial Agent breaches a fiduciary duty to the 
United States with respect to its responsibilities under this FAA.”). 
 88. See, e.g., id. § 12.H (“The Financial Agent covenants to disclose all ac-
tual or potential organizational conflicts of interest, including conflicts with 
the interests of any corporate parents, affiliates, and subsidiaries, and to 
avoid, mitigate, or neutralize to the extent feasible and to the Treasury’s satis-
faction any personal or organizational conflicts of interest that may be identi-
fied by the Treasury or the Financial Institution.”). 
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and prohibiting agents from delegating to others the work to be 
performed.89  
These financial agency agreements (FAAs) also protect con-
fidential information. They require financial agents “to use any 
confidential information or assets of the United States received 
or developed in connection with this FAA solely for the purpos-
es of fulfilling its duties to Treasury and not for its own com-
mercial purposes or for those of a third party.”90 They prohibit 
financial agents from disclosing confidential information except 
to Treasury employees and others “who have a legitimate need 
to know the information to assist in the proper performance of 
services required by” the agreement.91 These provisions express 
a fiduciary’s obligation not to exploit a beneficiary’s asset: the 
confidential information that belongs to the beneficiary.  
Some aspects of these agreements go beyond legitimate 
protection for a beneficiary’s confidential information. They 
prohibit financial agents from “mak[ing] statements to the me-
dia or issu[ing] press releases regarding their services under 
this FAA without the prior written consent of the Treasury.”92 
They prohibit the agent from revealing the agreement to third 
parties93 (although Treasury eventually posted redacted ver-
sions of all TARP FAAs and contracts on the web94). But what 
is most striking is that the agreements implement the confi-
dentiality obligation in a particularly strict way. They require 
that “prior to any submission for publication, any book, article, 
column or other written work for general publication that is 
based upon any knowledge . . . obtain[ed] during the course of 
. . . work in connection with the Treasury,” financial agent per-
sonnel must submit such manuscripts to the government for 
 
 89. See, e.g., id. § 13 (“The Financial Agent shall use only its own em-
ployees and employees of corporate affiliates to perform services under this 
FAA, unless the Financial Agent obtains the prior written consent of the Treas-
ury to use contractors to perform such services.”). 
 90. Id. § 5. 
 91. Id. § 6.D.  
 92. Id. § 25.B. 
 93. Id. § 25.C. 
 94. See About Financial Stability, U.S. DEPARTMENT TREASURY, http:// 
www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/about/procurement/faa/pages/faa 
.aspx (last visited Apr. 10, 2011) (listing the financial agency agreements); see 
also OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET 
RELIEF PROGRAM [SIGTARP], INITIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 22 (Feb. 6, 
2009), available at http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/congress/2009/SIGTARP_ 
Initial_Report_to_ the_Congress.pdf (noting that on December 2008 SIGTARP 
asked that all TARP agreements be posted on the web, and that on January 
28, 2009, the Treasury announced that it would do so). 
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review.95 The personnel also “assign to the Federal Government 
all rights, royalties, remunerations and emoluments that have 
resulted or will result or may result from any disclosure, publi-
cation, or revelation of confidential information not consistent 
with the terms of this Agreement.”96 These prepublication re-
view requirements apply not just to TARP financial agents, but 
also to TARP contractors.97 They exceed a mere prohibition on 
the disclosure of confidential information, imposing a prior re-
straint. They also require outsider personnel to check with 
Treasury before publishing anything related to the TARP work. 
While the government can and should protect the confidentiali-
ty of some TARP-related information, not every aspect of TARP 
work is confidential. Treasury’s TARP regulations do not men-
tion prepublication review, and its decision to include this pro-
vision in its contracts has escaped the scrutiny of the TARP 
oversight bodies and the press.  
Prepublication review agreements are not entirely unprec-
edented. The government has imposed them in at least one 
other context: intelligence. While most government employees 
and contractor personnel who are given access to classified in-
formation are subject to confidentiality agreements, intelli-
gence personnel also sign prepublication review agreements.98 
When a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employee 
published a book without going through prepublication review, 
the government sought a constructive trust on his earnings 
from the book.99 The Supreme Court sustained the constitution-
ality of his prepublication review agreement, recognizing the 
acute sensitivity of the information entrusted to CIA person-
nel.100 It imposed a constructive trust on this former employee’s 
royalties, noting his fiduciary status.101 But it is by no means 
clear that the information entrusted to TARP contractors is of 
similar sensitivity to that entrusted to intelligence personnel or 
that it justifies the extreme measure of a prior restraint.  
 
 95. Financial Agency Agreement, supra note 87, exhibit D, ¶ 7. 
 96. Id.  
 97. E.g., Contract No. TOFS-09-0009 with Simpson Thacher & Bartlett for 
legal services, Attachment J-1 Non-Disclosure Agreement, ¶ 7 (“I will submit 
to the Treasury for security review, prior to any submission for publication, 
any book, article, column or other written work for general publication that is 
based upon any knowledge I obtain during the course of my work in connec-
tion with the Treasury.”). 
 98. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 507–08 (1980). 
 99. Id. at 508. 
 100. Id. at 515–16. 
 101. Id. 
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III.  FIDUCIARY DUTIES: ATYPICAL FOR CONTRACTORS, 
BUT TYPICAL FOR EMPLOYEES   
While government bailouts may be exceptional events,102 
the government’s decision to rely on contractors to implement 
the bailout was far from exceptional. The government routinely 
relies on contractors to perform nearly all of its functions.103 If 
you pick almost any government task and examine who is ac-
tually performing it, you are likely to find that contractor em-
ployees—rather than or in addition to government employees—
are performing that task.104  
This reliance on contractors is true throughout the federal 
government, but some agencies rely more heavily on contrac-
tors than others.105 In some agencies, more than half of the 
 
 102. See Cheryl D. Block, Measuring the True Cost of Government Bailout, 
88 WASH. U. L. REV. 149, 152 (2010) (“[T]he extent and variety of recent gov-
ernment bailouts have been extraordinary . . . .”). 
 103. See PHILLIP J. COOPER, GOVERNING BY CONTRACT: CHALLENGES AND 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR PUBLIC MANAGERS 11 (2003) (“[A]gencies do not have the 
capacity to deliver directly the services and perform the tasks with which they 
are charged by law . . . [and] are forced to depend on contractors.”); Donald F. 
Kettl, After the Reforms, GOV’T. EXECUTIVE, Apr. 1988, at 38 (“The federal 
government . . . does relatively little itself. [I]t does most of its work through 
contracts with the for-profit and not-for-profit sectors, grants to state and local 
governments, special provisions in the tax code, and regulations on corporate 
and individual behavior.”). 
 104. See PAUL C. LIGHT, THE TRUE SIZE OF GOVERNMENT 197–98 (1999) 
(demonstrating the general decrease in civil service jobs and increase in con-
tract jobs across a variety of government agencies); Dan Guttman, Governance 
By Contract: Constitutional Visions, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 321, 322–23 (2004) 
(“In the global transformation from Government to governance . . . the United 
States pioneered in the renewed deployment of private contractors to perform 
the basic work of Government.”). See generally VERKUIL, supra note 9, at 2–3, 
31–33, 47, (describing how federal contracting spans military, environmental, 
natural disaster relief, homeland security, and transportation concerns). 
 105. The Department of Energy relies heavily on their contractors, prompt-
ing one analyst to say that the “Energy Department is little more than a hol-
low shell over a vast network of contractors.” Kettl, supra note 103, at 38. Sim-
ilarly, much of NASA’s work is done by contractors. Lodge 1858, Am. Fed’n of 
Gov’t Emps. v. Webb, 580 F.2d 496, 502 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“[C]ongress directed 
reductions in NASA’s civil service work force at the same time that it contin-
ued to approve its budget requests for funds to meet its obligations under its 
support service contracts . . . .”); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-119, 
HIGH RISK SERIES: AN UPDATE, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE 
ADMINISTRATION CONTRACT MANAGEMENT (2003) (“Much of NASA’s success 
depends on the work of its contractors . . . .”); Guttman, supra note 104, at 333 
(“NASA . . . was created with a fundamental dependence on contractors.”); 
Ariana Eunjung Cha, At NASA, Concerns on Contractors, WASH. POST, Feb. 
17, 2003, at A1, available at 2003 WLNR 18648342 (indicating that contrac-
tors train crew, draw up flight plans, “dominate mission control,” and perform 
shuttle maintenance and upgrades all with little or no oversight). 
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“workforce” consists of individuals who are actually employed 
by contractors.106 The tasks that contractor personnel perform 
are sometimes mundane, such as mowing lawns. But in other 
cases, the tasks are more sensitive or sophisticated, such as 
giving advice about how to structure or implement particular 
programs.107 
An extensive array of ethics statutes and rules regulate the 
ethics of government employees,108 and these restrictions large-
ly reflect employees’ fiduciary duties.109 They restrict em-
ployees’ financial interests, acceptance of gifts, outside activi-
ties, use of government resources (including information), and 
the kinds of work permissible after leaving the government.110 
These restrictions generally help to ensure that employees 
make decisions in the interest of the government rather than a 
private interest.111 
On the other hand, the government generally does not im-
pose ethics restrictions on the personnel of government contrac-
tors.112 It does not even have any systematic way of monitoring 
whether contractor personnel have conflicts of interest. The 
government has imposed restrictions based on the financial in-
terests of the companies that have government contracts, but 
 
 106. See Press Release, Senate Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs Comm., Lie-
berman, Collins Astounded DHS Contract Workers Exceed Number of Civilian 
Employees (Feb. 24, 2010), available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index 
.cfm?FuseAction=Press.MajorityNews&ContentRecord_id=01a96af1-5056-8059 
-7687-4190c852b289 (presenting a letter sent by senators to Secretary Janet 
Napolitano expressing surprise that the DHS has more contractor personnel 
than civilian employees). Similarly, “the vast majority of people working on 
the TARP today receive their paychecks from private companies, not the fed-
eral government.” CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, OCTOBER REPORT, supra note 4, 
at 3. The number of Treasury Department employees working on all TARP 
programs totals only 220, while a single TARP contractor has over 600 em-
ployees working on TARP. Id.  
 107. See Kathleen Clark, Financial Conflicts of Interest in and out of Gov-
ernment, 62 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 4), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1785520 (describing the 
work of Treasury contractor Dan Jester in connection with the bailout of AIG). 
 108. See Clark, supra note 30, at 58, 63–67 (describing the expansion of 
ethics regulation). 
 109. See CLARK, supra note 42, at 13 (“Congress and the executive branch 
have also recognized the fiduciary nature of government power by enacting 
statutes and regulations that reflect employee’s fiduciary duties.”); Clark, su-
pra note 30, at 73–77 (explaining why the fiduciary obligation is an appropri-
ate foundation for government ethics regulation). 
 110. CLARK, supra note 42, at 5–7. 
 111. Id. at 12–14. 
 112. Id. at 23 (“Most of the government ethics statutes and regulations de-
scribed [in the report] do not apply to government contractor personnel . . . .”). 
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they generally do not reach the interests of individual em-
ployees of those contractors.113 With these TARP regulations, 
Treasury became only the seventh federal agency to adopt eth-
ics regulations for contractor personnel.114  
  CONCLUSION   
Some commentators criticize the government’s extensive 
reliance on contractors.115 But the government has legitimate 
reasons for outsourcing some services to contractors rather 
than having its own employees perform these tasks. First, out-
sourcing enables the government to obtain expertise and skills 
not found among government employees.116 Second, it enables 
the government to respond quickly and flexibly to a sudden cri-
sis, giving it a surge capacity to temporarily increase its work-
force for tasks lasting months or a few years rather than dec-
ades.117 
 
 113. Some have argued that these organizational conflicts of interest are 
actually aimed at protecting the interests of other government contractors 
more than the interests of the government itself. See, e.g., Daniel Guttman, 
Organizational Conflicts of Interest and the Growth of Big Government, 15 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 297, 312–13, 316–17 (1978). 
 114. See CLARK, supra note 42, at 28 (indicating the Treasury as one of 
seven agencies with regulations). 
 115. See, e.g., Dan Guttman, The United States Enrichment Corporation: A 
Failing Privatisation, 23 ASIAN J. PUB. ADMIN. 247, 265–67 (2001) (concluding 
that the U. S. Enrichment Corporation failed and proposing reasons for its 
failure). 
 116. See ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
AND FEDERAL SERVICE 148–49 (1960) (indicating the government can get ex-
pertise from individuals they could not otherwise employ); BAYLESS MANNING, 
FEDERAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAW 31 (1964) (“[Contracting has] made it 
possible to turn to government use and public advantage the talents of many 
. . . who would not have been willing to become regular government em-
ployees.”). 
 117. See, e.g., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., 
HURRICANE KATRINA TEMPORARY HOUSING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
CONTRACTS 2 (2008), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/ 
OIG_08-88_Aug08.pdf (“FEMA human capital resources were not sufficient to 
coordinate the massive and urgent logistical response effort without substan-
tial assistance. FEMA awarded contracts to four contractors . . . .”). Ironically, 
the Inspector General investigation previously cited was itself outsourced to 
an accounting firm, and the Inspector General’s office merely added a three-
paragraph preface and a coversheet. See Letter from Jocelyn Hill, Partner, 
Williams, Adley & Company, LLP, to Mathew Jadacki, Deputy Inspector Gen., 
Office of Inspector Gen., Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Mar. 20, 2008), in 
HURRICANE KATRINA TEMPORARY HOUSING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
CONTRACTS, supra (available prior to the table of contents of the Inspector 
General investigation). Some argue that outsourcing saves the government 
money, see Steven J. Kelman, Achieving Contracting Goals and Recognizing 
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Both of these factors played a role in the government’s de-
cision to rely on contractors in connection with its bailout of fi-
nancial institutions. The government enlisted contractors to 
perform a wide range of services: legal services, the valuation of 
assets to be sold, the management of assets whose ownership 
would be maintained, and auditing.118  
When the government decides to rely on outsiders rather 
than its own employees to perform a task, it needs to determine 
whether those outsiders should be subject to fiduciary-based 
standards. Not all contractors should be. But contractors who 
can influence government decisions or have access to govern-
ment resources (including confidential information) should be 
subjected to fiduciary-based ethics standards. 
Congress and Treasury have imposed a comprehensive set 
of ethics restrictions on the outsiders implementing the TARP 
program. These restrictions reflect the fiduciary nature of the 
outsiders’ role: the government has entrusted them with access 
to government assets, and is trusting them to influence gov-
ernment action. Several aspects of the ethics standards for 
TARP contractors are relatively unusual, including: reaching 
not just the individual interests of contractor personnel, but al-
so the interests of their family members; requiring contractor 
personnel to disclose their financial interests; and providing the 
flexibility to exempt “administrative services” from enhanced 
ethics standards. Another unusual feature of Treasury’s con-
tracts with outsiders was its imposition of prepublication re-
view agreements—something that appears to be unprecedented 
outside the intelligence field.  
Treasury’s decision to rely on outsiders was not unusual, 
but its decision to impose fiduciary-based ethics restrictions on 
the outsiders implementing TARP was. Its actual experience in 
imposing these standards should be studied more closely to as-
 
Public Law Concerns: A Contracting Management Perspective, in 
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 153, 
180 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009) (suggesting government jobs 
do not pay enough to keep some of the talent in the private sector). But there 
is no consensus on this issue. Compare Chris Edwards, Public Sector Unions 
and the Rising Costs of Employee Compensation, 30 CATO J. 87, 90 tbl.1 (2010) 
(indicating that compensation for state and local workers is higher than pri-
vate sector employees), with Jeffrey Keefe, Debunking the Myth of the Over-
compensated Public Employee: The Evidence (EPI Briefing, Paper No. 276, 
2010), available at http://epi.3cdn.net/8808ae41b085032c0b_8um6bh5ty.pdf  
(detailing the controversy surrounding public sector compensation).  
 118. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, OCTOBER REPORT, supra note 4, at 23 
fig.3. 
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sess the costs and benefits of imposing fiduciary-based ethics 
standards on outsiders who do the government’s work. The 
government is currently considering imposing some of these 
features, including financial disclosure requirements, on a 
broader set of contractor personnel: those who assist the gov-
ernment in contracting.119 The costs involved in implementing 
this kind of financial disclosure regime and the First Amend-
ment concerns raised by the imposition of prepublication re-
view should be examined more closely before the government 
expands these approaches to protecting the public trust.  
  
 
 119. Preventing Personal Conflicts of Interest for Contractor Employees 
Performing Acquisition Functions, 74 Fed. Reg. 58,584–89 (Nov. 13, 2009) (to 
be codified at 48 C.F.R. pts. 3, 52). 
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APPENDIX: ETHICS RESTRICTIONS ON EMPLOYEES OF 
BAILOUT CONTRACTORS 









individuals”a &  
“management 
officials perform-
ing work under 
the” contractb 
“a personal, business, or financial 
interest of an individual, his or her 
spouse, minor child, or other family 
member with whom the individual has 
a close personal relationship, that 
could adversely affect the individual’s 
ability to perform under the arrange-
ment, his or her objectivity or judg-
ment in such performance, or his or 




partners, &  
employees 
accept / solicit favors / gifts / items of 
monetary value from any individual or 
entity whom the retained entity / of-
ficer / partner / employee knows is 
seeking official action from Treasury 
in connection with the arrangement or 
has interests which may be substan-
tially affected by the performance or 
nonperformance of duties to Treasury 













ing work under 
the arrangement 
& key  
individuals 
purchase / offer to purchase / assist 







sell / offer to sell / act on behalf of any






ing work under 
the arrangement 
& key  
individualsg 
“Disclose nonpublic information to 
anyone”  
“Use or allow the use of any nonpublic 







“Improperly use or allow the improper 
use of Treasury property for the per-
sonal benefit of any individual or enti-
ty other than the Treasury”i 
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IMPLEMENTATION MECHANISMS 












“information . . . in writing about their personal, business, and 
financial relationships, as well as those of their spouses, minor 
children, and other family members with whom the individuals 
have a close personal relationship that would cause a reasonable 
person with knowledge of the relevant facts to question the individ-
ual’s ability to perform, his or her objectivity or judgment in such 
performance, or his or her ability to represent the interests of the 
Treasury”j 
certification that they will not disclose nonpublic information, or 
use or allow the use of nonpublic information to further any private 
interestk 
the information described above at a level of detail at least as ex-
tensive as the public financial disclosures required of high-level 
officials (Office of Government Ethics Form 278)l 
Disclosure of Financial Interests / Certification of No 
Conflicting Interests to Agency 
Personnel 
Affected 








certify that these individuals have no personal conflicts of interest, 
or are subject to a mitigation plan or waiver approved by Treasurym 








must provide “[p]eriodic training to ensure that [they] know their 
obligation to maintain its confidentiality and to use it only for pur-
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identifies “administrative services” that are exempt from COI 
regulationso 
receives contractors’ written notification of OCIsp & disclosure / use 
of nonpublic informationq 
evaluates whether proposed measures adequately mitigate PCIsr 
can waive PCIss 
can waive any regulatory requirement “that is not otherwise 
imposed by law when it is clear from the totality of the circum-
stances that a waiver is in the government’s interest”t 
 
                                                                                    
 a. A “key individual” is “an individual providing services to a private sec-
tor entity who participates personally and substantially, through decision, ap-
proval, disapproval, recommendation, or the rendering of advice, in the nego-
tiation or performance of, or monitoring for compliance under” the contract. 31 
C.F.R. § 31.201 (2010) (emphasis added). 
 b. Id. § 31.212(a). A “management official” is “an individual within a re-
tained entity’s organization who has substantial responsibility for the direc-
tion and control of the retained entity’s policies and operations,” including 
members of a management committee or executive committee or (in entities 
without such a committee) general partners. See id. § 31.201. 
 c. Id. § 31.201. The TARP regulation does not impose restrictions direct-
ly on contractor personnel. Instead, it mandates that contractors ensure that 
their employees have no personal conflicts of interest. Id. 
 d. Id. § 31.213(a)(1). 
 e. Id. § 31.214(a). 
 f. Id. § 31.214(b). 
 g. Id. § 31.217(c)(5). The TARP regulation does not impose confidentiali-
ty requirements directly on contractor personnel. Instead, it imposes these 
confidentiality restrictions on the contracting entity and requires that the en-
tity obtain from these individuals nondisclosure agreements. Id. 
 h. Id. § 31.217(b). The TARP regulation defines “nonpublic information” 
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